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TORTS AND INNOVATION 
Gideon Parchomovsky* 
Alex Stein** 
This Essay exposes and analyzes a hitherto overlooked cost of tort 
law: its adverse effect on innovation. Tort liability for negligence, 
defective products, and medical malpractice is determined by refer-
ence to custom. We demonstrate that courts’ reliance on custom and 
conventional technologies as the benchmark of liability chills inno-
vation and distorts its path. Specifically, recourse to custom taxes 
innovators and subsidizes replicators of conventional technologies. 
We explore the causes and consequences of this phenomenon and 
propose two possible ways to modify tort law in order to make it 
more welcoming to innovation. 
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Introduction 
Innovation is a key determinant of wellbeing and economic growth.1 
Academic discussions of innovation are typically confined to the domains of 
patent and trade secret law. This Essay highlights a previously underappre-
ciated connection between innovation and tort law.2 It seeks to expose and 
analyze the cost the current design of our tort system imposes on innovation. 
The main thesis of the Essay is that courts’ reliance on customs and conven-
tional technologies as the benchmark for assigning tort liability chills 
innovation and distorts its path. This reliance taxes innovators and subsi-
dizes users and replicators of conventional technologies. 
The centrality of custom to our torts system can best be seen in three 
main doctrines that make up tort law: negligence, product liability, and 
medical malpractice. Begin with negligence. In assessing a defendant’s con-
duct, courts presume that a defendant who fails to comply with safety-
related customs prevalent in her industry acts negligently. The defendant 
consequently needs to rebut this presumption, which may in many cases be 
very difficult to do. Likewise, in product liability, courts turn to custom in 
determining whether the defendant’s product design was defective. Devia-
tion from industry custom, therefore, runs a greater risk of a ruling that the 
product is unsafe. Finally, in the area of medical malpractice, courts hold 
doctors to the “customary care” standard. A physician’s failure to comply 
with this standard exposes her to a higher prospect of liability. 
In short, custom constitutes the benchmark against which defendants’ 
conduct is evaluated.3 The law of torts relies on custom not only directly, by 
associating custom with precautions against harm that a reasonable person 
ought to take, but also indirectly, through evidentiary rules and presump-
tions that bolster the centrality of custom to adjudicative determinations of 
fault.4 Chief among those rules is the res ipsa loquitur presumption that cre-
ates a strong evidential association between safety and conventional 
                                                                                                                      
 1. See e.g., David Warsh, Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations: A Story of Eco-
nomic Discovery (2006) (discussing the importance of innovation to economic growth). 
 2. This neglect is quite surprising considering the classic “rewards insight” of Steven Shavell 
& Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & Econ. 525 (2001). 
Shavell and van Ypersele have established that, under certain conditions, paying innovators for their 
inventions would promote the incentive to innovate in a socially much better way than giving inno-
vators intellectual property rights. This insight calls for elimination of any negative rewards that 
innovators receive from the legal system, and rules of tort liability skewed against innovators consti-
tute a negative reward. See generally Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of 
Law 177–99 (2004) (demonstrating how overbroad liability rules chill socially beneficial activities). 
 3. See infra Part I.  
 4. Courts’ decisions about negligence routinely rely on proxies and evidentiary devices that 
include custom, the res ipsa loquitur rule, and accepted expert opinion. See, e.g., Twyman v. 
Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 633 (Tex. 1993) (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting) (“ ‘The issue of 
negligence is seldom decided without guidance from some external source: custom, relevant statutes 
and regulations, evidentiary doctrines such as res ipsa loquitur, or expert testimony on alternatives.’ ” 
(quoting Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 42, 56 
(1982))). 
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precautions against harm. Under this presumption, an unusual occurrence 
featuring an infliction of harm by an instrumentality over which the defen-
dant exercised exclusive control prompts an inference that the defendant was 
negligent.5 Taking conventional precautions against harm removes the oc-
currence from the “unusual” category.6 Failure to take conventional 
precautions, in contrast, indicates negligence on the part of the defendant 
not only when she takes no precautions whatsoever, but also when she elects 
to employ a novel—i.e., unconventional—technology.7 When res ipsa ap-
plies, the case goes to trial automatically and the plaintiff is entitled to a jury 
decision on whether the defendant acted negligently, even when she cannot 
point to any specific negligent act.8 The ensuing prospect of losing the case 
puts the defendant under a serious pressure to settle. 
Another rule inimical to innovation is the Frye doctrine9 that controls the 
admissibility of expert evidence in many state jurisdictions.10 Under Frye, 
expert testimony that falls outside of scientific or technological consensus is 
inadmissible as evidence and cannot be presented to fact finders. This evi-
dential incapacitation works against innovators and in favor of users and 
producers of conventional technologies. 
To appreciate the combined effect of these doctrines and rules on inno-
vation, consider the following example.11 Assume that Jane, a physician, 
invents a new method of stabilizing the heads of patients who suffer back 
                                                                                                                      
 5. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 39, at 
243 (5th ed. 1984) (“In its inception the [res ipsa loquitur] principle was nothing more than a rea-
sonable conclusion, from the circumstances of an unusual accident, that it was probably the 
defendant’s fault.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 244–48 (explaining that the res ipsa rule ap-
plies predominantly to unusual events). 
 6. See, e.g., Aderhold v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 643 S.E.2d 811 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) 
(denying res ipsa to a shopper struck by a box that fell from a shelf at a home improvement store). 
The court noted that “the manner in which the boxes were stacked . . . did not appear to be unusual 
or dangerous.” Id. at 812. For more details see infra notes 47–53 and accompanying text. 
 7. See, e.g., Hailey v. Otis Elevator Co., 636 A.2d 426, 428 (D.C. 1994) (“Given the power 
of res ipsa loquitur to satisfy without further proof the element of negligence and the consequent 
caution with which it should be applied, we think that where the plaintiff relies upon ‘common 
knowledge’ to invoke the doctrine, the fact that such events do not ‘ordinarily’ occur ‘without negli-
gence’ must be based upon a widespread consensus of a common understanding.” (emphasis 
added)). For more details see infra notes 47–53 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 45–46, 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 10. The Daubert Trilogy, infra note 60, that applies in federal courts and, with some modifi-
cations, in more than half of the states attenuates the anti-innovation bias only slightly. See infra text 
accompanying notes 62–68. 
 11. This example is based on a true story one of us heard from a practicing physician. See also 
Edward P. Monico et al., The Impact Of Evidence-Based Medicine And Evolving Technology On The 
Standard Of Care In Emergency Medicine, 3(2) Internet J. Law, Healthcare & Ethics (2005), 
http://www.ispub.com/ostia/index.php?xmlFilePath=journals/ijlhe/vol3n2/evidence.xml (“[T]he cus-
tomary [care] standard provides a safe haven for physicians who align themselves with the status quo 
regardless of whether or not this affiliation reflects the latest medical information. . . . [C]ustom may 
contribute to the tremendous delay between discovery of effective therapies and their routine use.”). 
As an example of this phenomenon, Monico et al. cite physicians’ general reluctance to perform 
ultrasound-guided central venous access—a novel procedure presently depressed by the custom 
rules. Id. 
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injuries in automobile accidents. Unfortunately, it is not fail-safe: two percent 
of the accident victims treated with Jane’s stabilization method will suffer 
permanent damage to the spine. Nevertheless, Jane’s method is superior to the 
customary treatment, which injures five percent of the victims. Assume fur-
ther that the cost of treating patients is the same under both methods. From a 
social standpoint, it is clear that Jane’s method should replace the customary 
treatment. However, the rules of tort liability will probably prevent this so-
cially beneficial development. Under these rules, physicians using Jane’s 
innovative method will be exposed to a much higher risk of liability than 
physicians who adhere to the customary method. Indeed, it is quite possible 
that users of the customary method will successfully fend off all suits 
against them, whereas adopters of Jane’s method will have to compensate 
the victims in all cases in which the treatment fails. Anticipating this out-
come, innovators like Jane may decide in many cases to put their inventive 
skills to rest and forego their attempts to improve upon conventional wis-
dom altogether.  
The custom-based design of our tort law, especially when coupled with 
the evidence rules used by courts, subsidizes producers and users of conven-
tional technologies while taxing innovators. Innovation entails three distinct 
activities: coming up with a viable idea for a new invention, research and 
development (“R&D”), and commercialization or marketing the invention to 
the public.12 Naturally, innovators critically depend on the reaction of the 
market to their innovation; the market success of a new technology deter-
mines the innovator’s reward. Failure in the marketplace implies that 
investments in R&D (and the innovator’s opportunity costs) will not be re-
cuperated. As we will show, however, the market’s reaction to an innovation 
is a function not only of the innovation’s quality but also of the innovator’s 
expected liability in torts. When an innovator cannot reduce this liability by 
improving the quality of her innovation, the effect of the law of torts on the 
incentive to innovate is perverse. 
To be sure, we do not argue that tort law stops all innovators dead in 
their tracks; many innovations are produced even under the current regime. 
Yet the heightened risk of liability puts a drag on innovation and diverts its 
path.  
                                                                                                                      
 12. We are aware of the possible argument that commercialization is not really part of the 
inventive process, among other things because it is usually not carried out by innovators. A typical 
innovator sells her invention to an entrepreneur and exits the scene. However, we chose to include 
the commercialization stage in the inventive process for two reasons. First, successful commerciali-
zation directly influences the return from innovation and thus affects the ex ante incentives to 
innovate. Second, the commercial success of the invention may bear on its patentability. In deciding 
whether an invention has satisfied the statutory non-obviousness requirement, courts often rely on 
the commercial success of the invention on the market. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan-
sas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (“Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long 
felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances 
surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or 
nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.”). For criticism, see Robert P. Merges, Com-
mercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 803, 
842–52 (1988). 
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The exact effect on innovation is a function of the magnitude of the nec-
essary investment in R&D and the size of the improvement an innovation 
represents over existing alternatives. The greater the investment in R&D 
necessary to produce a certain innovation, the greater is the risk that the in-
novation will not be produced. By contrast, an innovation that substantially 
improves upon existing alternatives will likely be produced despite the R&D 
costs. Either way, the increased liability innovators face raises the total cost 
of producing innovations and, consequently, the price consumers must pay 
for new technologies and products that do reach the market.  
When R&D costs are moderate or low, innovators may elect to complete 
the development stage, and when possible, even patent their inventions, be-
cause they expect no tort liability at these early stages. Many innovators, 
however, will stop short of commercializing their inventions because com-
mercialization may lead to liability in torts. This dynamic will leave society 
with a list of unimplemented inventions—both patented and unpatented. 
In addition to chilling innovation, the custom rules skew the direction of 
technological progress. The heightened risk of liability for tort damages in-
duces innovators to limit their R&D endeavors to the conventional 
technological frameworks. Instead of focusing upon genuine technological 
breakthroughs, innovators will strive to produce incremental improvements 
on customary and conventional technologies.  
The distortionary effect of the torts system on innovation may be rectified, 
however. We propose two possible reforms that achieve this goal. First, 
policymakers can make tort law more welcoming to innovation by eliminating 
the privileged status of custom and moving to a pure cost-benefit system. We 
term this alternative “equalizing down.” Implementation of this reform will 
free courts from the need to consider custom in determining defendants’ 
liability and allow them to compare the defendants’ conduct to other 
alternatives without putting a thumb on the scale. We are aware of the fact that 
the custom rules produce certain social benefits. Adherence to custom 
facilitates fact-finding, shields defendants from the juries’ whims and biases, 
and makes tort adjudication more consistent and predictable.13 These benefits 
are capped, however: they can never exceed the total social value produced by 
all tort suits. On the other hand, the social value of innovation is virtually 
limitless. One successful innovation in the area of medicine, for instance, may 
save thousands of lives and alone outweigh the benefits of the custom rules. 
Nevertheless, we recognize the fact that some may be wary of a 
wholesale abolition of the custom rules. For them, we propose a different 
and arguably more innovative reform: an “equalizing up” approach.14 
Instead of abolishing the custom rules, it is possible to keep them and grant 
certain innovations, approved by special boards of industry experts, the 
same privileged status as enjoyed by custom. Adoption of this proposal 
would require establishing special boards comprised of industry experts, 
                                                                                                                      
 13. See infra note 16 and sources cited therein; see also infra notes 116–119 and accompany-
ing text. 
 14. See infra Section III.B. 
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who will review the safety of scientific and technological innovations in 
their relevant areas of expertise. Innovations that successfully pass the 
review will be placed on a par with conventional technologies and will 
receive the same deference from courts in tort actions. The review process 
we propose will be optional (rather than mandatory) and private (rather than 
state controlled). Implementation of this reform will allow the legal system 
to unlock much of the value the custom rules currently depress without 
foregoing the rules’ benefits.  
Structurally, this Essay unfolds in three parts. Part I demonstrates the 
centrality of custom rules to the design of our torts system. Part II discusses 
the perverse effect of custom rules on innovation. Part III proposes two pos-
sible reforms to eliminate the anti-innovation bias of tort law and analyzes 
the relative benefits and costs of each. A short conclusion follows. 
I. The Central Role of Custom in Tort Law 
The law of torts assigns liability for harms individuals inflict on others. 
Yet not all harms give rise to liability; only those resulting from behavior 
that falls short of socially acceptable standards will have this effect.15 In de-
ciding what behavior is socially unacceptable, courts routinely turn to 
custom.16 Custom plays a key role in this process.17  
                                                                                                                      
 15. See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 8, at 12 (2000) (describing tort liability as 
premised on deviation from acceptable standards); Keeton et al., supra note 5, § 1, at 6 (same). 
 16. See Keeton et al., supra note 5, § 33, at 193–96; James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Con-
straint in Tort, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 901, 924 (1982) (calling courts’ resort to customary standards 
“avoidance by delegation”); James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and 
the Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1382 
(1994) (explaining and analyzing the “customary care” standard for doctor-patient relationships);  
Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1999);  
Steven Hetcher, The Jury’s Out: Social Norms’ Misunderstood Role in Negligence Law, 91 Geo. L.J. 
633, 646–47 (2003) (“[J]uries do not engage in [abstract cost-benefit analysis], but instead draw from 
their diverse array of everyday norms and customs when providing concrete substance to the abstract 
reasonable person standard to render a decision on the issue of negligence.”); Fleming James, Jr. & 
David K. Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conduct in Negligence Trials, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 697, 
712–13 (1952) (underscoring the centrality and utility of courts’ reliance on custom in determining 
negligence); Patrick J. Kelley, Who Decides? Community Safety Conventions at the Heart of Tort Li-
ability, 38 Clev. St. L. Rev. 315, 353–63 (1990) (arguing that, instead of relying on cost-benefit 
analysis, negligence decisions based on the “reasonable person” standard use customs and community 
norms as a benchmark); Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 1147 (1942) 
(underscoring the centrality and utility of courts’ reliance on custom in determining negligence); David 
G. Owen, Proving Negligence in Modern Products Liability Litigation, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 1003, 1017 
(2004) (“[W]hether a person who has caused harm to another acted or failed to act as similar persons 
customarily act in the same situation goes to the heart of negligence determinations.”); Stephen R. 
Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in Philosophy and the Law of Torts 
72, 113–14 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (observing that harms that are actionable in torts result from 
deviations from a customarily accepted level of risk); David A. Urban, Comment, Custom’s Proper 
Role in Strict Products Liability Actions Based on Design Defect, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 439, 440 (1990) 
(criticizing California courts’ departure from the generally accepted custom-based ascertainment of 
product defects for leaving judges and juries “in a vacuum”). But see Richard A. Epstein, The Path to 
The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1992) 
(criticizing modern courts’ tendency to place cost-benefit analysis ahead of custom in ascribing liability 
in torts). 
 17. See Dobbs, supra note 15, § 164, at 396; Keeton et al., supra note 5, § 33, at 193–96. 
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The centrality of custom in our torts system is most readily apparent in 
negligence cases, where courts associate defendants’ failure to comply with 
relevant industry customs with negligence. Similarly, in the area of product 
liability, courts turn to custom in evaluating the safety of defendants’ prod-
ucts: deviation from industry customs constitutes evidence that the 
defendant’s product was unsafe. Finally, in medical malpractice suits, courts 
use “customary care” as the standard of care physicians are expected to fol-
low when treating their patients. Provision of noncustomary care exposes 
physicians to a heightened prospect of liability.  
Conversely, a defendant’s compliance with custom substantially in-
creases her chances to defend against negligence and defective-product 
allegations. In the medical malpractice area, a doctor’s compliance with the 
“customary care” standard is virtually certain to defeat the action. Custom-
ary compliance thus separates between two categories of defendants who 
cause damage to another person. Defendants who violate custom are very 
likely to assume liability in torts; defendants who comply with custom will 
likely go scot-free. 
The remainder of this Part analyzes the rules that establish the centrality 
of custom in the law of torts. We address both the substantive doctrines of 
liability and the evidence rules employed by courts. 
A. Custom and Liability for Negligence 
Under general negligence doctrine, failure to comply with relevant in-
dustry customs indicates that a defendant acted negligently.18 In the 
Restatement’s words, “[i]n determining whether conduct is negligent, the 
customs of the community, or of others under like circumstances, are factors 
to be taken into account, but are not controlling where a reasonable man 
would not follow them.”19 Accordingly, a defendant’s deviation from the 
relevant industry custom constitutes evidence that she acted negligently. Al-
though this finding, on its own, is not supposed to be dispositive and may be 
countered by the defendant,20 as a practical matter, noncompliance with  
                                                                                                                      
 18. See Dobbs, supra note 15, § 164, at 397.  
 19. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 295A (1965); see also Fed. R. Evid. 406 (customs 
and routine practices admissible as evidence to prove action in conformity). 
 20. The comments to the Restatement clarify the relevance of custom:  
If the actor does what others do under like circumstances, there is at least a possible inference 
that he is conforming to the community standard of reasonable conduct; and if he does not do 
what others do, there is a possible inference that he is not so conforming. . . . [W]here there is 
nothing in the situation or in common experience to lead to the contrary conclusion, this infer-
ence may be so strong as to call for a directed verdict, one way or the other, on the issue of 
negligence. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 295A cmt. b. The Restatement further notes that “[a]ny such 
custom is . . . not necessarily conclusive . . . . Customs which are entirely reasonable under the ordi-
nary circumstances which give rise to them may become quite unreasonable in the light of a single 
fact in the particular case.” Id. § 295A cmt. c. 
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custom often dooms defendants.21 Thus, in the absence of proof to the con-
trary, evidence of the defendant’s failure to comply with the relevant 
industrial custom allows the judge to give a directed verdict on the issue of 
negligence.22 
Consider the following example.23 A train passenger slips into the gap 
between the platform and the train and suffers serious injuries to her leg. 
The platform’s design is customary. The passenger sues the company that 
owns both the train and the station for negligent operation and maintenance 
of the station. She produces expert testimony that the company could en-
hance the passengers’ safety at a low cost by making the gap narrower than 
it was.24 Will the passenger prevail? On these facts, the answer is no. The 
expert testimony carries no weight when it challenges the customary design 
of rapid transit systems, with which the company had conformed. To suc-
ceed in her lawsuit, the passenger would need to establish that this industry-
wide custom was unreasonably dangerous. A mere showing of a potentially 
safer alternative to the custom will not do,25 especially when the station, 
used by about three million passengers, had experienced only two similar 
accidents in the past.26 
Courts’ adherence to custom is predicated on the assumption that what is 
ordinarily done by actors engaged in a similar activity is what an ordinarily 
careful actor should do under the same circumstances.27 Specifically, cus-
toms are believed to reflect the conventional assessment of the risks of harm 
that a given set of circumstances involves, the precautions ordinarily taken 
to meet those risks, the feasibility of those precautions relative to alterna-
tives, the actor’s ability to have all this information, and, finally, the general 
expectation that he and others will follow the conventional wisdom.28  
Defeating a defendant’s evidence of customary compliance is, indeed, 
extremely difficult.29 The plaintiff may overcome custom by showing that 
                                                                                                                      
 21. This practice has an obvious explanation: custom integrates the conventional wisdom—a 
decisional shortcut which is both easy and sensible to apply without generating much controversy 
over the court’s decision. See Dobbs, supra note 15, § 164, at 395–96; Keeton et al., supra note 5, 
§ 33, at 193–94. 
 22. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 295A cmt. b; see also Owen, supra note 16, at 
1038 (“A defendant’s violation of a relevant safety standard set . . . by the defendant’s industry by 
custom . . . ordinarily will go far in proving a plaintiff’s negligence claim.”). 
 23. This example is adapted from Sledd v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 
439 A.2d 464 (D.C. 1981) (per curiam). 
 24. Id. at 469. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. (affirming grant of summary judgment on that basis). 
 27. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 295A cmt. b (1965); Dobbs, supra note 15, § 164, 
at 396; see also Bowan ex rel. Bowan v. Express Med. Transporters, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 452, 460 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2004), reh’g and/or transfer denied (May 13, 2004). 
 28. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 295A cmt. b. 
 29. Judge Learned Hand observed that “in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact com-
mon prudence.” The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d. Cir. 1932); see also Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp. v. Nutt, 407 A.2d 606, 610–12 (D.C. 1979). 
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the circumstances of the case are so unusual as to make the customary pre-
cautions inappropriate.30 This possibility is rare by definition. The plaintiff 
may also demonstrate that the existing custom is a product of collusive un-
derstandings within the industry to which the defendant belongs.31 If the 
plaintiff succeeds in proving such a conspiracy, the defendant’s negligence 
would be established instantaneously,32 and the defendant would likely have 
to pay punitive damages as well.33 Because a successful conspiracy showing 
exposes the entire industry to the risk of class action, evidence of conspiracy 
is rarely available. Firms make every effort to conceal it as well as to re-
move any trace of conspiratorial understandings that place the public at 
risk.34  
The most promising way of countering the defendant’s custom evidence, 
therefore, is to identify a readily available precaution against damage that 
the customary practice had missed. This strategy stems from two torts clas-
sics: Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Behymer35 and The T.J. Hooper.36 These 
decisions established, respectively, that “[w]hat usually is done may be evi-
dence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a 
standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or 
not,”37 and that “in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common pru-
dence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly 
lagged in the adoption of new and available devices.”38 
As attested in The T.J. Hooper, evidence that the industry had missed a 
readily available, cost-justified precaution can only be found in rare cases.39 
Behymer is one such case. There, railroad companies customarily required 
employees to deice railroad cars while standing on their slippery tops, with-
out making sure that the cars did not move.40 This Dickensian custom was 
disturbingly unsafe, which made it an easy premise for Justice Holmes’s 
sharp differentiation between the “is” and the “ought.” The T.J. Hooper pre-
sents another setting that one rarely comes across. There, a tugboat caught 
                                                                                                                      
 30. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 295A cmt. c. 
 31. See id. (noting that courts should disregard a custom resulting from a “deliberate disre-
gard of a known risk”). 
 32. See, e.g., Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 645 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 1994) (affirming imposition of 
substantial liability in torts on Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation for conspiring with other 
asbestos manufacturers to conceal hazards of asbestos); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard, 
749 So. 2d 483, 487 (Fla. 1999) (holding Owens-Corning liable for concealing dangers of asbestos 
while marketing asbestos-contaminated products). 
 33. See Owens-Corning, 749 So. 2d at 485 (stating that the jury assessed thirty-one million 
dollars in punitive damages against Owens-Corning); Dobbs, supra note 15, § 381, at 1062–63. 
 34. See Owens-Corning, 749 So. 2d at 487 (describing extensive cover-up by Owens-
Corning to avoid liability). 
 35. 189 U.S. 468 (1903). 
 36. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). 
 37. Behymer, 189 U.S. at 470. 
 38. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740. 
 39. See id.  
 40. See Behymer, 189 U.S. at 469–70. 
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by a storm had lost a barge it was towing—damage that could easily have 
been prevented by notifying the boat’s operator about the impending storm. 
This notification could have been transmitted by radio without problems, but 
the industry’s custom was to allow tugboats to sail with no radio equipment 
on board.41 For Judge Hand, this “slack” was a straightforward affront to 
common sense.42 
Nowadays, of course, such self-incriminating industry practices rarely 
take place. Every modern industry makes a sustained effort to appear safe in 
order to boost sales and turn its customs and protocols into reliable evidence 
in courts of law.43 Industries’ conscious effort to adopt and foster customs 
increases the probability that a firm that aligns with the industrial custom 
will escape liability for harms it causes. Correspondingly, it also increases 
the probability that a firm that fails to align with the custom will assume 
liability for these harms. This dynamic creates a powerful incentive for firms 
to comply with existing industrial customs and rely upon conventional tech-
nologies. 
Two additional rules of evidence bolster the centrality of custom: the res 
ipsa loquitur presumption,44 and the Frye doctrine,45 which governs the ad-
missibility of expert evidence in numerous jurisdictions.46  
The res ipsa loquitur rule allows fact finders to hold the defendant neg-
ligent when three cumulative conditions are present: (a) the plaintiff’s 
damage is caused by an agency or instrumentality over which the defendant 
exercised exclusive control, (b) the plaintiff’s conduct does not contribute to 
the occurrence of that damage, and (c) the injury could not ordinarily occur 
without negligence.47 
                                                                                                                      
 41. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1027, 1038–39 (1990) (“[F]irms with an earned reputation for safety can enjoy competitive 
advantages in product and labor markets.”). 
 44. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D (1965) (“It may be inferred that harm 
suffered by the plaintiff is caused by negligence of the defendant when . . . the event is of a kind 
which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence . . . .”). For specifics and rationales of 
the res ipsa rule, see Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Tort Liability under Uncertainty 84–100 
(2001). 
 45. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (conditioning the admissi-
bility of expert evidence upon the “standing and scientific recognition” of its underlying scientific 
knowledge). 
 46. The Frye doctrine continues to apply in California, New York, and numerous other states. 
See, e.g., Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 857 N.E.2d 1114, 1119–20 (N.Y. 2006) (reaffirming Frye’s 
controlling status in New York law); People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976) (adopting 
Frye’s general acceptance standard in California law); People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 324–31 (Cal. 
1994) (reaffirming applicability of Kelly-Frye standards in California courts and declining to switch 
to Daubert); see also Christian v. Gray, 65 P.3d 591, 595 n.2 (Okla. 2003) (listing Frye jurisdictions, 
Daubert jurisdictions, and undecided jurisdictions). 
 47. See Dobbs, supra note 15, § 154, at 370–71; Porat & Stein, supra note 44, at 84. 
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The final condition refers to courses of events that “common experience 
of mankind”48 categorizes as ordinary. This condition of res ipsa privileges 
conventional knowledge over its rivals. By doing so, it induces firms to ad-
here to customary precautions: taking those precautions negates the 
condition. When customary or “ordinary” precautions do not prevent the 
plaintiff’s damage, the occurrence of that damage is not deemed an event 
that ordinarily involves negligence on the part of the defendant. Instead, 
courts perceive the damage as practically unavoidable.49 Conversely, when 
the defendant’s instrumentality damages the plaintiff and the customary pre-
cautions are not taken, the res ipsa rule will likely apply.50 This means that 
the negligence presumption extends to cases in which the defendant used 
novel technology to avoid damage to the plaintiff instead of taking the cus-
tomary precautions against that damage. 
The train-station accident, discussed earlier,51 exemplifies how the res 
ipsa rule works. There, the customary status of the gap between the train 
and the platform denies res ipsa to the passenger whose leg was trapped in 
the gap. Because the train company complies with the custom of the rapid 
transit systems industry, the gap does not classify as unusual and cannot 
evidence negligence. The two other conditions of res ipsa are present, but 
two out of three is not enough. The res ipsa rule will not apply.  
In sum, by taking customary precautions, the defendant will not always 
avoid the plaintiff’s damage but will always escape the consequences of res 
ipsa. This factor may be crucial to the lawsuit. When, as in the train-station 
example,52 the plaintiff has no evidence identifying the specifics of the de-
fendant’s negligence and cannot rely on res ipsa, the judge will dismiss the 
lawsuit.53  
                                                                                                                      
 48. Porat & Stein, supra note 44, at 88; see also Ex parte Mobile Power and Light Co., 
810 So.2d 756, 759 (Ala. 2001) (interpreting the “ordinary” condition of res ipsa as referring to 
“common knowledge and the experience of mankind” (quoting Khirieh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 594 So.2d 1220, 1223 (Ala. 1992))). 
 49. See, e.g., Coalite, Inc. v. Aldridge, 229 So.2d 524, 533–34 (Ala. Ct. App. 1968) (approv-
ing application of res ipsa in an action for damages resulting from a coal mining company’s blasting 
operations because the company failed to show alignment with the industry custom with respect to 
the amount of explosives used); Darlington Corp. v. Finch, 149 S.E.2d 861, 861–62 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1966) (denying res ipsa to a plaintiff injured by an elevator’s closing doors when evidence showed 
that “[the elevator] had been installed in accord with the American Standard and Safety Code, spon-
sored by the American Institute of Architects, the National Bureau of Standards, and the American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers” and underwent routine inspections in the building); Ursini v. Ky. 
Kingdom, Inc., Nos. 2002-CA-00267-MR; 2002-CA-000560-MR; 2003 WL 1948872 *3 (Ky. Ct. 
App. Apr. 25, 2003) (“[The plaintiff] has failed to show that anything unusual happened during or 
immediately after the ride. . . . In the absence of proof that some out of the ordinary event occurred, 
[res ipsa loquitur] has no application.”).  
 50. See, e.g., Buckelew v. Grossbard, 435 A.2d 1150, 1158 (N.J. 1981) (“We hold . . . that 
expert testimony to the effect that the medical community recognizes that an event does not ordinar-
ily occur in the absence of negligence may afford a sufficient basis for the application of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.”). 
 51. See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text. 
 52. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Dobbs, supra note 15, § 154, at 370–71. For a telling example featuring a plaintiff 
crying for help, see Rabena v. City of New York, 556 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Civ. Ct. 1990) (dismissing a 
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Now consider the following example of an elevator accident. A person in-
advertently leans against an elevator’s closed doors on the tenth floor. The 
doors open, and the person falls down the shaft to his death. His descendants 
sue the building’s maintenance company for wrongful death. The elevator and 
its equipment were routinely inspected and found to be in good working con-
dition. The company also had installed Z-brackets, which, according to 
conventional knowledge, substantially reduce the probability of the doors 
opening.54 Under this scenario, as in the train-station case, the plaintiffs would 
not be able to rely on res ipsa and the company would likely be entitled to a 
directed verdict in its favor.  
But what if the company used a new technology instead of Z-brackets? 
What if it installed a special control system that keeps the elevator’s doors 
locked until the cabin’s arrival to the floor?55 Assume that the probability of 
this system’s malfunction is roughly similar to that of Z-brackets’ failure, but 
the technology used to develop the novel control system is not yet conven-
tional knowledge. Under this set of facts, the accident would classify as an 
occurrence that ordinarily involves negligence on the part of the company. 
This is what the res ipsa rule says when Z-brackets are not installed. The case 
would consequently go to the jury, and the company would be facing a serious 
risk of liability.56 
The second evidence rule that encourages adherence to custom is the Frye 
doctrine. Under Frye, testimony of a scientific or technological expert can 
only be admitted into evidence when the expert’s opinion represents knowl-
edge that has gained “standing and scientific recognition” in the relevant 
community of experts.57 This doctrine, too, elevates conventional knowledge 
over scientific and technological innovations. To see how, return to our eleva-
tor-accident example and assume that the company calls an expert witness to 
testify about the advantages of the new control system. Assume further that 
the new technological knowledge—explaining how the novel system works 
and why its malfunction is as improbable as a Z-bracket’s failure—has yet to 
receive “standing and scientific recognition.” Under the orthodox understand-
ing of Frye, if the expert based her testimony on novel engineering principles, 
                                                                                                                      
lawsuit lacking evidence that could identify the wrongdoer or the instrumentality that caused the 
injury brought by a mother of a mentally retarded child who was taken unharmed on a bus from 
home to school and returned home with a thigh injury). 
 54. For a newspaper report about the Z-bracket technology, see Anahad O’Connor & Tanzina 
Vega, Queens Elevator Accident Kills 2, Just After Similar Death at a Club, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 
2007, at B1. 
 55. This new technology does not actually exist. We made it up for purposes of our example. 
 56. See Dobbs, supra note 15, § 164, at 397–98; Porat & Stein, supra note 44, at 90. 
 57. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). As explained in 1 Charles 
Tilford McCormick et al., McCormick on Evidence § 203, at 827 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th 
ed. 2006), Frye’s “general acceptance” standard requires the proponent of an expert’s testimony to 
“show that the scientific community agrees that the principles or techniques on which the expert 
relies are capable of producing accurate information and conclusions.” This requirement disqualifies 
expert testimony not aligning with conventional wisdom. See id. at 828 (giving examples of novel 
scientific findings that “have fallen prey to [Frye’s] influence”). 
PARCHOMOVSKY & STEIN FINAL PRINT1 B.DOC 10/20/2008 10:52 AM 
November 2008] Torts and Innovation 297 
 
the judge should rule it inadmissible.58 As a consequence, the company would 
have no defense against the lawsuit.59  
Federal law and numerous states have replaced the Frye doctrine with a 
set of rules known as the “Daubert Trilogy.”60 This change, however, does not 
                                                                                                                      
 58.  The classic article on the subject attests that “[i]t is unresolved whether the Frye stan-
dard requires general acceptance of the scientific technique or of both the underlying principle and 
the technique applying it,” Paul Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. 
United States a Half Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1212 (1980), and that court decisions 
dealing with this issue are not uniform, id. at 1211–14. This uncertainty originates from Frye’s for-
mulation that “while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be 
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” 
Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added). For a strict version of Frye, see Overton v. State, 976 So. 2d 
536, 550 (Fla. 2007) (“In utilizing the Frye test, the burden is on the proponent of the evidence to 
prove the general acceptance of both the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures 
used to apply that principle to the facts of the case at hand.” (quoting Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 
1164, 1168 (Fla. 1995))); Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 857 N.E.2d 1114, 1119–20 (N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he 
Frye test asks ‘whether the accepted techniques, when properly performed, generate results ac-
cepted as reliable within the scientific community generally.’ ” (citation omitted) (quoting People v. 
Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454 (N.Y. 1994) (emphasis added))); State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201, 1238 
(Wash. 2006) (“Washington has adopted the Frye test for evaluating the admissibility of new scien-
tific evidence. . . . Both the scientific theory underlying the evidence and the technique or 
methodology used to implement it must be generally accepted in the scientific community for evi-
dence to be admissible under Frye.” (citing State v. Gore, 21 P.3d 262, 271-72 (Wash. 2001))); 
Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 133 (Ariz. 2000) (explaining that Frye blocks the admission of 
“novel scientific principles, formulae, or procedures developed by others”); Caldwell v. State, 393 
S.E.2d 436, 441 (Ga. 1990) (“In many states, the test for admissibility of novel scientific evidence is 
whether the scientific principle or discovery supporting the evidence is sufficiently established to 
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. This is not the test in 
Georgia. . . . We hold that it is proper for the trial judge to decide whether the procedure or tech-
nique in question has reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty . . . .” (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted)); People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976) (“The primary advan-
tage . . . of the Frye test lies in its essentially conservative nature. For a variety of reasons, Frye was 
deliberately intended to interpose a substantial obstacle to the unrestrained admission of evidence 
based upon new scientific principles.”). See also David L. Faigman, Admissibility Regimes: The 
“Opinion Rule” and Other Oddities and Exceptions to Scientific Evidence, The Scientific Revolu-
tion, and Common Sense, 36 Sw. U. L. Rev. 699, 701–02 (2008) (“Frye-like tests typically focus on 
whether experts from a particular field accept the empirical basis for the opinion . . . . A Frye test 
contemplates that judges need bring little or no knowledge of research methods to the admissibility 
decision. The test can be applied simply by counting the noses of members of the pertinent field. In 
contrast, Daubert requires judges to have fairly developed empirical sensibilities, since they must 
evaluate the methods and principles underlying the proffered expertise.” (footnotes omitted));  
Joseph J. Ortego & James W. Weller, Products Liability and the Elements of Science: Admissibility 
of Expert Testimony in New York and Other Frye States, 41 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 83 (2005) 
(surveying Frye states’ restrictions on the admissibility of novel scientific and technological knowl-
edge). For a relaxed version of Frye, see, for example, Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1045 
(Pa. 2003) (“[I]n applying the Frye rule, we have required and continue to require that the proponent 
of the evidence prove that the methodology an expert used is generally accepted by scientists in the 
relevant field as a method for arriving at the conclusion the expert will testify to at trial. This does 
not mean, however, that the proponent must prove that the scientific community has also generally 
accepted the expert's conclusion.” (citations omitted)). 
 59. Sledd v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 439 A.2d 464, 469 (D.C. 1981) (per 
curiam), is a parallel example of an expert’s failure to challenge conventional wisdom. There, the 
court dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit summarily. 
 60. Cases forming this trilogy are Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 
579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 
526 U.S. 137 (1999). The trilogy substituted the Frye standard by a multifactor balancing test that 
requires the trial judge (1) to make sure that the methodology underlying the expert’s testimony can 
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materially affect our analysis: a defendant who chooses to use new technolo-
gies over conventional ones would hardly fare better in a Daubert 
jurisdiction.61  
Daubert’s multifactor screening of expert testimony includes four criteria 
that might keep the company’s expert away from court.62 One of those criteria, 
again, is the expert’s alignment with the conventional technological wisdom. 
This criterion is discretionary, rather than mandatory, but failure to satisfy it 
increases the probability that the testimony will be excluded.63 Another crite-
rion is a peer-reviewed publication of the expert’s methodology.64 This 
criterion is particularly hostile to technological innovations that are kept se-
cret—away from imitators’ eyes—for business reasons. Apart from that, peer 
review is often a wall erected by old-timers that innovators will find difficult 
to penetrate.65 A similar timing problem arises in connection with two addi-
tional criteria set by Daubert: replicability of the new methodology66 and 
ascertainment of its error rate.67 For these criteria to be met, the new technol-
ogy usually needs to undergo a long series of tests that will determine its 
dependability.68 
Collectively, the custom rules tell firms, “if you want to minimize your 
prospect of paying for damages that your activities may cause, go conven-
tional, align yourself with the custom and never stand out.”  
                                                                                                                      
be tested by other experts; (2) to consider whether this methodology underwent peer review and was 
published in the academic or professional literature after undergoing examination for possible flaws; 
(3) to take into account the error rate, actual or potential, that accompanies the expert’s testimony 
and methodology; (4) to see whether this methodology attains acceptance in the relevant scientific 
or professional community; (5) to examine the expert’s inferences from methodology to conclusions 
for the presence of analytical gaps; and, finally, (6) to look into the testimony’s capacity to mislead 
or prejudice the jury. For informative discussion of this test, see 1 McCormick et al., supra note 
57, § 203, at 831–33. 
 61. See Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Sci-
entific Admissibility Standards, 91 Va. L. Rev. 471 (2005) (demonstrating empirically, using a 
jurisdiction-removal criterion for ascertaining tort defendants’ revealed preferences, that the shift 
from Frye to Daubert has brought about no real changes on the ground in state courts). 
 62. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–95. 
 63. Id. at 594. 
 64. Id. at 593–94. 
 65. David F. Horrobin, The Philosophical Basis of Peer Review and the Suppression of Inno-
vation, 263 JAMA 1438 (1990) (arguing that peer review generally favors conventional wisdom and 
tends to suppress innovation). 
 66. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 67. Id. at 594. 
 68. Cf. 1 McCormick, supra note 57, § 203, at 832–33 (describing ways to gain acceptabil-
ity in the general scientific community). 
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B. Custom and Product Liability  
Custom also plays a crucial role in the area of product liability.69 Under 
the prevalent product-liability regime, a manufacturer’s conformity with the 
relevant industrial custom70 is admissible as evidence tending to prove that 
its product was safe and not defectively designed.71 Conversely, a manufac-
turer’s failure to conform to custom constitutes evidence—once again, 
inconclusive—of the presence of a defect in its product.72 Custom is taken 
into account in the determination of design defects under both the “risk-
utility”73 and the “consumer expectation”74 tests. Under these tests, a product 
classifies as defective when it creates a risk of harm that exceeds its benefits 
or falls far below a reasonable consumer’s expectation. 
The effect of these custom rules is substantial. A product that conforms 
to the customary design will normally classify as more beneficial than risky 
and as satisfying a reasonable consumer’s expectation. The product conse-
quently will be held safe and non-defective, despite the damage consumers 
may have suffered from using it. Conversely, a product that deviates from 
customary design will almost certainly fail both the “risk-utility” and the 
“consumer expectation” tests.75 This failure will result in the classification of 
the product as unsafe and defective.76  
                                                                                                                      
 69. See David G. Owen, Proof of Product Defect, 93 Ky. L.J. 1, 5–10 (2004) (documenting 
massive use of industry customs as a benchmark for determining design defects in product liability 
actions). Industry customs affect predominantly products’ designs. We therefore do not discuss here 
actions complaining about manufacturing defects or inadequate instructions and warnings. Cf. Re-
statement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 (1998) (specifying three distinct categories 
of product liability: liability for defectively designed products, liability for manufacturing defects, 
and liability for inadequate instructions and warnings accompanying the product). 
 70. Note that industrial custom is not exactly the same as the “state of art” upon which 
manufacturers often rely in defending against product liability lawsuits. Custom is what manufac-
turers habitually do in producing the product. State of art refers to a general technological ability to 
make a safe product. See Keeton et al., supra note 5, § 99, at 701. Manufacturers may or may not 
customarily utilize the state-of-art technology. Whether they do so or not is an empirical question. 
See Urban, Comment, supra note 16, at 440 n.4. 
 71. Owen, supra note 69, at 7–8.  
 72. Id. at 7. 
 73. See David G. Owen et al., 2 Madden & Owen on Products Liability § 27.6, at 
823–28 (3rd ed. 2000). 
 74. Id. at 824–26. 
 75. Id. at 823–28. For recent court decisions on that issue, see Moore ex rel. Moore v. Missis-
sippi Valley Gas Co., 863 So.2d 43, 46–47 (Miss. 2003) (defendant’s evidence that its water heater 
conformed with industry standards defeated suit for hot water burns sustained by plaintiff); and 
Alfred v. Caterpillar, Inc., 262 F.3d 1083, 1088 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that failure of defendant’s 
equipment to comply with industry standards evidences presence of a defect in the equipment, al-
though it does not yet establish that the equipment was unreasonably dangerous to ordinary 
consumers). 
 76. See Owen et al., supra note 73, at 823–28. 
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Effectively, the “risk-utility” and “consumer expectation” tests institute a 
fault-based negligence regime for imposing liability for defective products.77 
They introduce the principles of negligence into liability that purports to be 
strict on paper.78  
It should be noted that courts in California and several other jurisdic-
tions have adopted an unmitigated strict liability regime with respect to 
defective products.79 For that reason, they have ruled that evidence of the 
manufacturer’s compliance with the relevant industrial custom is irrelevant 
and consequently inadmissible.80 This liability regime does not discourage 
technological innovation, and we therefore use it in Part III as a model for 
one of our reform proposals. 
C. Custom and Medical Malpractice 
In many relationships between professionals and their clients, custom 
serves as a modifiable contractual default.81 The doctor-patient relationship 
best exemplifies this “custom as default” model.82 A doctor’s basic duty is to 
treat her patients with customary medical care.83 Specifically, the doctor 
must follow the standards accepted by doctors practicing in the same area or 
specialty.84 Doctors and patients are not free to downscale this “customary 
                                                                                                                      
 77. Dobbs, supra note 15, § 358, at 987; see also Owen, supra note 69, at 5 (“The admissi-
bility of customary industry standards [in product liability actions] derives from the use of this type 
of evidence for nearly two centuries in negligence law . . . .”). 
 78. Dobbs, supra note 15, § 358, at 987. 
 79. See, e.g., Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 147, 164 (Ct. App. 2006) (“A 
manufacturer cannot defend a product liability action with evidence it met its industry’s customs or 
standards on safety. . . . [A]dmission of such evidence is reversible error.” (citations omitted)); 
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 378 (Ct. App. 1981) (noting that custom is irrele-
vant to California’s risk-benefit test for design defects and consequently inadmissible as evidence); 
Titus v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 154 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126 (Ct. App. 1979) (stating that custom is in-
admissible because defendant’s compliance with custom does not shield him from strict liability for 
defective products). 
 80. See Buell-Wilson, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 164; see also Holloway v. J.B. Sys., Ltd., 609 F.2d 
1069, 1073 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that trade customs cannot be admitted into evidence under the 
Pennsylvania law of product liability). For criticism of these rulings, see Urban, Comment, supra 
note 16, at 463–65. 
 81. See Dobbs, supra note 15, § 242, at 631–32. 
 82. See id. § 242, at 631–33; see also Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 16, at 1382. 
 83. See Dobbs, supra note 15, § 242, at 633; Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 16, at 1382; 
see, e.g., Franklin v. Gupta, 567 A.2d 524 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (exemplifying the “customary 
care” standard in the medical malpractice law). 
 84. See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) (voiding on public policy 
grounds an agreement incorporating patient’s waiver of tort suits for treatments falling below the 
“customary care” standard); Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 275 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) 
(same); Meiman v. Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1969) (same); Cudnik v. William  
Beaumont Hosp., 525 N.W.2d 891, 894–96 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental 
Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 1990) (same); Dedely ex rel. Dedely v. Kings Highway Hosp. 
Ctr., Inc., 617 N.Y.S.2d 445 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (same); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977) 
(same); see also Tatham v. Hoke, 469 F.Supp. 914 (W.D.N.C. 1979) (voiding on public policy 
grounds a $15,000 damage limitation for substandard treatment that appeared in patient’s informed-
consent form). 
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care” standard.85 An agreement that allows a doctor to provide a patient sub-
standard medical care without exposing himself to liability for malpractice 
contravenes public policy and is therefore invalid.86  
Rules controlling medical malpractice cases differ from the general neg-
ligence and product-liability regimes in one important respect. Under these 
rules, a doctor’s compliance with the relevant custom, practice, or “school 
of thought” does not merely evidence the delivery of adequate care. Such 
compliance is adequate care as a matter of substantive law.87 By proving her 
compliance with the relevant customary norm, the doctor therefore does 
more than simply increase her chances of winning the case; she guarantees 
herself this result.88 
But the default “customary care” standard is not mandatory. If a patient 
wants to purchase an upscaled treatment and a doctor is willing to provide 
it, the parties are free to go ahead and substitute the custom default with the 
chosen “upscaled treatment” agreement.89 Similarly, when a doctor offers an 
innovative treatment, she and her patient can enter into a special “experi-
mental treatment” agreement that would override the custom default and 
enable the doctor to deliver the treatment to the patient.90 Before making 
such an agreement, however, the doctor must inform the patient about the 
nature of the new treatment and its conventional alternatives.91 The patient 
                                                                                                                      
 85. See cases cited supra note 84.  
 86. See cases cited supra note 84. 
 87. See Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1992) (articulating the “school of thought” rule 
as a complete defense against medical malpractice allegations); Dobbs, supra note 15, § 242, at 633; 
Lawrence O. Gostin & Peter D. Jacobson, Law and the Health System 430 n.1 (2006); 
Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 16, at 1382. Note, however, that experimental treatments do not 
qualify as a “school of thought.” Yates v. Univ. of W. Va. Bd. of Trs., 549 S.E.2d 681, 690 & n.14 
(W. Va. 2001). Also note that courts may scrutinize doctors’ customs that determine the level of risk 
of injury or death to which a doctor may and may not expose her patient. See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 
519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974). 
 88. See Dobbs, supra note 15, § 242, at 633; Gostin & Jacobson, supra note 87, at 430; 
James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)Reasonable Care (March 14, 2008) (unpublished manu-
script, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1109170) (identifying the “doctrinal feedback” dynamic 
involving overcautious doctors whose excessive precautions against harm cyclically transform into 
legally binding customs); cf. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Mal-
practice Law at the Millennium, 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 163, 172–79 (2000) (demonstrating that 
some courts treat doctors’ compliance with medical customs as strong but nondecisive evidence of 
due care). 
 89. See, e.g., Sullivan v. O’Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973) (holding that such under-
takings are valid and enforceable, subject to the “clear and convincing proof” requirement for oral 
agreements to upscale the treatment). 
 90. See  Baird v. Am. Med. Optics, 713 A.2d 1019, 1028 (N.J. 1998) (holding an experimen-
tal-treatment agreement valid upon ascertainment of patient’s informed consent); Estrada v. Jaques, 
321 S.E.2d 240, 254 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (same). 
 91. See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and 
Experimental Therapy, 28 Am. J.L. & Med. 361, 365–67, 375 (2002) (specifying, analyzing, and 
criticizing the “informed consent” requirements for experimental-treatment agreements). See gener-
ally Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 Yale L.J. 899 (1994) (evaluating the 
existing requirements for “informed consent”). Note that providers of conventional medicine have 
no parallel obligation to inform patients about available experimental treatments. See Moore v. 
Baker, 989 F.2d 1129, 1133 (11th Cir. 1993) (“The law requires disclosure only of those alternatives 
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must then give her consent to the treatment, thereby sealing the formation of 
the parties’ special agreement. After granting her informed consent, the pa-
tient can no longer sue the doctor for deviation from the custom.92 The 
parties’ agreement would trump the custom. 
The rationale of these rules is two-fold. The doctor and the patient are 
not strangers to each other. Their relationship is formed by mutual contrac-
tual undertakings that can be—and often are—expressly negotiated.93 
Subject to the public-policy ban of substandard care, the doctor and the pa-
tient therefore can determine the treatment that best suits the patient’s needs 
(and ability to pay for the treatment). The custom default here mirrors what 
doctors and patients typically agree to, considering the existing regulatory 
and self-regulatory requirements with which doctors must comply.94 These 
requirements give patients a reliable quality assurance with respect to doc-
tors’ work. Based on this assurance, patients normally agree to receive the 
customary treatment without negotiating it expressly. This contracting 
mechanism economizes on transaction costs and spares patients from engag-
ing in lengthy and nettlesome discussions about risks and harms.  
A special “experimental treatment” agreement between the doctor and 
the patient not only overcomes the custom default but also precludes the 
applicability of the res ipsa rule in its custom-driven format. Once a valid 
agreement for receiving treatment that falls outside the ordinary has been 
entered, the patient can no longer base her lawsuit against the doctor on 
what does and does not happen “in the ordinary course of events”—the very 
foundation of res ipsa. 
The evidentiary requirements that control the admission of expert testi-
mony are similarly adjusted. The signing of an “experimental treatment” 
agreement bars the patient from complaining against the treatment’s uncon-
ventional nature. She would only be able to make malpractice allegations 
about the way in which the doctor actually delivered the special treatment. 
Medical experts testifying for both sides consequently would have to focus 
on the new treatment’s nature and benefits. The custom-driven doctrines of 
Frye and Daubert would not block their testimony.  
In theory, then, in the context of medical malpractice, custom constitutes 
a default rule around which the parties can contract. As a result, custom’s 
chilling effect on medical innovations is much smaller than in the other ar-
eas we discussed. All the doctor or a medical institution needs to do to get 
                                                                                                                      
that are ‘generally recognized and accepted by reasonably prudent physicians.’ ” (quoting Ga. Code 
Ann. § 31-9-6.1(a)(5) (1991))). 
 92. The experimental treatment still needs to be performed adequately, though. Failure to do 
so would expose the doctor to liability for malpractice. See, e.g., Lenahan v. Univ. of Chi., 808 
N.E.2d 1078, 1084–85 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 2004) (holding that medical personnel must exercise rea-
sonable care in administering experimental treatments and that a hospital can be held liable for its 
failure to supervise those who provide such treatments). 
 93. See Richard A. Epstein, Mortal Peril: Our Inalienable Right to Health Care? 
6–8 (1997); Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 Am. B. Found. 
Res. J. 87. 
 94. See Dobbs, supra note 15, § 242, at 631–32. 
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around custom is to label innovative procedures (or devices) “experimental” 
and secure the informed consent of the patient to the treatment. The contrac-
tual “custom default” therefore only imposes on doctors and medical 
institutions the extra cost of obtaining informed consent from the patient. 
This extra cost seems quite minimal, given that virtually any medical treat-
ment already requires informed consent.95  
In practice, however, overcoming custom is a much more difficult and 
costly task than it initially appears. Attempts to contract around the default 
of customary care raise costs both ex ante and ex post for doctors and medi-
cal institutions—and the combined increase might, in fact, be quite 
substantial. Ex ante, the need to label the new treatment “experimental” is 
likely to frighten away some patients by undermining their confidence in the 
treatment. Securing the patient’s consent to an experimental treatment may 
therefore become challenging. Ex post, the “experimental” label makes the 
agreement more susceptible to judicial intervention and invalidation. The 
unusual character of the treatment is likely to induce courts to scrutinize the 
doctor-patient agreement more closely and expand the patient’s ability to 
sue the doctor.96 Naturally, the willingness of the courts to review agree-
ments concerning “experimental treatment” strengthens patients’ motivation 
to disregard their consent to the treatment and sue physicians in spite of the 
agreement.  
II. Custom Rules and Incentive to Innovate 
As we showed in Part I, custom rules protect firms and individuals that 
rely on conventional knowledge and technologies from liability in torts. This 
Part carries out a detailed examination of the effect of these rules on the in-
centive to innovate. We first examine the ex post effects of custom rules on 
innovation and social welfare and then turn to the ex ante effects. By “ex 
                                                                                                                      
 95. Some jurisdictions base informed consent actions on the torts of assault and battery. 
There, informed consent needs to be obtained only with respect to invasive treatments, as opposed to 
treatments that are merely therapeutic. Noah, supra note 91, at 365; e.g., Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 
A.2d 617, 619–20 (Pa. 1997). 
 96. This expanded ability originates from the courts’ requirement that doctors tell patients 
that the treatment is experimental, that its risks and benefits are unknown, and that they have little or 
no experience with the treatment. See Estrada v. Jaques, 321 S.E.2d 240, 254–55 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1984) (summarizing case law from several jurisdictions and interpreting patients’ right to informed 
consent to include the entitlement to a full “experimental treatment” warning). Apart from that, 
doctors need to inform the patient about the conventional alternatives to the proposed treatment, 
Noah, supra note 91, at 366, a requirement that sharply contrasts with the rule that expressly ex-
empts conventional doctors from the duty to inform the patient about the experimental alternatives 
to their proposed treatment. E.g., Moore, 989 F.2d at 1133. Courts also have underscored doctors’ 
financial and career benefits from delivering experimental treatments as a reason for subjecting the 
patient’s agreement to undergo such a treatment to heightened scrutiny. Estrada, 321 S.E.2d at 255; 
Darke v. Estate of Isner, 17 Mass. L. Rptr. 689 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2004). Some courts even require 
doctors to reveal to the patient their success rate with the experimental treatment. See, e.g., Gaston v. 
Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 351 n.26 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (“In the case of a new or unusual procedure, 
the individual physician’s experience and ‘track record’ would seem even more important than when 
an established, common procedure is contemplated.”). These chilling effects will likely be exacer-
bated by the “doctrinal feedback” dynamic identified by Gibson, supra note 88. 
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post effects” we refer to the effects of custom rules on the market reception 
of innovations that have been produced. By “ex ante effects” we refer to the 
effects of custom rules on the production and design of innovations.  
A. Ex Post Effects 
We illustrate the ex post effects of the custom rules on innovation by 
discussing a simple example. Innovator N develops a new technology for 
maintaining electric hoists. The new technology is as safe as but more cost-
effective than the dominant technology on the market. Absent liability for 
accidents, N can provide the new maintenance service at $80 per hoist. 
N is not the only provider on the market for hoist-maintenance services, 
however. Her competitor is O, who provides a similar service using the old 
and conventional technology. Absent liability for accidents, O can provide 
the maintenance service at a price of $100 per hoist. 
Under a no-liability assumption, over time N will drive O out of the 
market and the new technology will replace the old. This, of course, is the 
socially efficient outcome.  
Under current negligence regime, the analysis changes dramatically. Tort 
liability for providers of hoist-maintenance services is determined by the 
general negligence doctrine. This doctrine holds that a provider must make a 
reasonable professional effort to avoid accidents and uses the existing indus-
try custom as a benchmark. The doctrine also applies all other custom rules. 
In this case, O is far less likely to be held negligent than N. The old and 
the new technology are equally prone to accidents. But the custom rules tax 
N and subsidize O. They help O defeat most lawsuits and expose N to an 
increased prospect of liability for accidents. 
Realizing her heightened risk of liability, N adds $50 to what she would 
otherwise charge per hoist; and so her final price is $130. O, in contrast, 
knows that his expected liability for tort damages is minimal. O therefore 
adds only $10 to his basic price and charges $110 per hoist. As a result, N 
would either abandon her technology or undersupply the service. Both out-
comes are inefficient and detrimental to society. 
Importantly, the same result will obtain even in cases where the new 
technology is actually safer and is likely to reduce the rate of accidents. 
Imagine that N’s technology reduces the probability of accidents by 50%. 
Will it win over the conventional technology? Not necessarily. As long as 
the expected cost from the increased liability is greater than the expected 
cost-saving from the decline in the probability of accidents, the new tech-
nology will not be adopted. For simplicity’s sake, assume that the 
conventional technology causes ten accidents per year and the new technol-
ogy causes only five. Assume further that if the operator is held negligent, 
the average damage award is $100,000 per accident. Finally, assume that 
due to the liability regime we discussed, adopters of the customary technol-
ogy will prevail in 90% of the negligence suits against them, while adopters 
of the new technology will always lose. Under these assumptions, the new 
technology will be adopted only if it generates sufficiently large operational 
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cost-savings to offset the expected payouts to plaintiffs. In our case, the new 
technology will be adopted only if it reduces operation costs by $400,000 
per year. The resulting decrease of social welfare is apparent. 
A similar anti-innovation bias exists in the area of product liability. To il-
lustrate, let’s revisit the elevator-accident example.97 There, the plaintiffs 
could also sue the elevator’s manufacturer on the ground that the elevator’s 
design was defective. Under that scenario, if the manufacturer had installed 
conventional Z-brackets, it would have defeated the defective design claim 
because the technology would pass the prevalent doctrinal tests for “risk-
utility” and “consumer expectation.”98 However, if the manufacturer had 
instead chosen to install a new control system in its elevators, the probability 
of losing the case under both “risk-utility” and “consumer expectation” 
standards would increase exponentially. 
While the effect of medical malpractice rules on innovation is more nu-
anced, at the end of the day, they too discourage innovation. As we will 
show, the difference between negligence and product liability, on the one 
hand, and medical malpractice, on the other, is one of degree, not kind. To 
see this, imagine manufacturer M who develops a new intra-ocular lens for 
surgical implantation in the eyes of people suffering from cataracts. This 
device substantially reduces the risk of eye inflammation and infection rela-
tive to existing lenses. The project’s profitability crucially depends on 
economies of scale. To make a profit, M needs to sell a very large number of 
new lenses, which means that the number of ophthalmologists willing to use 
the new lens must be very high. Accordingly, M contemplates organizing, at 
its expense, a special training course for ophthalmologists to induce them to 
adopt the new technology.  
Will M succeed in introducing her innovative lenses to the market? The 
answer is unclear. The existing rules of “informed consent” impose special 
burdens on doctors who decide to adopt the new lens. These doctors must 
notify their patients about the lens’s “experimental” status and tell each pa-
tient that the procedure’s risks and benefits are as yet unknown. Moreover, 
the doctors are required to disclose to patients the benefit they received from 
M in the form of the free special training and reveal their motivation to use 
M’s lens. These disclosure requirements raise transaction costs for doctors 
who wish to implement the new technology. The higher transaction costs put 
the innovation-seeking doctors at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their more con-
servative peers, because the latter need not incur the cost of securing their 
patients’ special consent to experimental treatment. The disclosure require-
ments the law places on the doctors will likely drive some patients away. 
Anticipating this, many doctors may decide not to order M’s innovative 
lenses. This means that M’s lenses will succeed in the market only if the 
medical benefits they generate are significant enough to compensate doctors 
for the increase in the negotiation and litigation costs they stand to incur if 
they offer them. Otherwise, M’s lenses, like many other innovative products, 
                                                                                                                      
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 54–56.  
 98. See supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text. 
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will be spurned by doctors. The effect of all this on social welfare is, of 
course, negative. 
From an ex post perspective, the use of custom in the torts system in-
creases the cost of commercializing innovations after their development. 
The distribution of the extra cost between producers and consumers will 
naturally depend on the elasticity of demand. When demand is highly ine-
lastic, as is the case with life-saving innovations, the extra cost will be borne 
by consumers and the innovation will be produced. In cases where demand 
is elastic, however, producers will have to bear the extra cost of the in-
creased legal liability. In such cases, innovators who will not be able to pass 
enough of the extra cost to consumers may simply choose to forego the in-
novation altogether. We now turn to discuss this possibility.  
B. Ex Ante Effects 
The analysis so far has taken an ex post perspective. We examined the 
interactions that follow an innovation’s development and identified their 
welfare-reducing effects. The ex ante effects of an innovator’s heightened 
risk of liability are even more significant. In some cases, this risk may pre-
vent development of new technologies ab initio. Realizing that the market 
may refuse to adopt new technologies for fear of the increased liability as-
sociated with them, firms may elect to forego the development of new 
technologies altogether.  
Innovation involves three distinct stages:  
(i) conception; (ii) development; and (iii) commercialization. The concep-
tion stage, representing the genesis of the inventive process, entails coming 
up with a viable idea for a new invention. The development stage encom-
passes the research and labor necessary to transform the idea into a 
patentable application (i.e., to operationalize it). Finally, the commerciali-
zation stage requires marketing the invention to the public.99  
While all three stages are important, the commercialization stage has the 
greatest effect on innovators. The success of new technologies determines 
the innovators’ reward. Failure to win over consumers implies that invest-
ments in R&D will not be recuperated. Hence, it is not surprising that even 
patented inventions are of relatively little value before their successful 
commercialization. Yet, the pro-status-quo bias of tort law impedes the in-
troduction and adoption of new technologies. Aware of this bias, some 
inventors may decide that it is not worth their while to pursue innovative 
technologies and will invest their resources elsewhere.  
We do not argue, of course, that all innovation will come to a halt. The 
precise effect of tort liability on innovation depends on the relevant R&D 
costs innovators must incur to produce new technologies and the superiority 
                                                                                                                      
 99. Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Marketplace for Ideas?, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 395, 
398 (2005). 
PARCHOMOVSKY & STEIN FINAL PRINT1 B.DOC 10/20/2008 10:52 AM 
November 2008] Torts and Innovation 307 
 
of the results over conventional alternatives.100 An innovator will consider 
carrying out her idea when her expected profit is greater than the costs of 
R&D. The anticipated payout to tort plaintiffs, however, always adds to the 
innovator’s costs, thereby eroding her incentive to innovate. In some cases, 
this erosion may forestall the innovation completely. In others, it induces the 
innovator to develop and patent the innovation but stop short of commercial-
izing it because of increased tort liability. Patent scholars have noted that 
less than five percent of patented inventions are of any value; the remaining 
ninety-five percent lay fallow, failing to yield any return to the inventors.101 
While we clearly do not claim that the anti-innovation bias of our torts sys-
tem is solely, or even mostly, responsible for the large number of inventions 
that are never put to commercial use,102 it likely contributes to this phe-
nomenon.  
Kip Viscusi and Michael Moore’s leading empirical study of the effects 
of product liability on technological innovations partially bears out our pre-
dictions.103 The study’s main finding is that product liability chills 
innovation only at very high levels of expected liability payouts.104 The study 
identifies no negative correlation between low to moderate liability payouts 
and the firms’ innovative activities.105 For high liability payouts, however, it 
does find a strong negative correlation.106 This finding proves that high levels 
of product liability depress innovation.107 
                                                                                                                      
 100. Cf. Mark Geistfeld, Products Liability, in 3 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 
347, 363 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). Professor Geistfeld argues that 
product liability motivates the development of novel safety technologies, which makes it welfare-
enhancing. Id. As we explain in the text, however, custom rules give manufacturers a more attractive 
alternative: replication of conventional technologies. This alternative is privately cheaper but so-
cially costlier than investing in safety-focused R&D. Similarly, Professor Benjamin H. Barton 
claims that tort liability spurs innovation and uses anecdotal evidence of playground designs to 
substantiate this claim. Benjamin H. Barton, Tort Reform, Innovation, and Playground Design, 58 
Fla. L. Rev. 265 (2006). He too fails to acknowledge the perverse effects of the custom rules. As 
we explain in the text, those rules subsidize innovations falling within the accepted technological 
paradigm (as seems to be the case with Professor Barton’s playgrounds) and tax paradigm-shifters. 
 101. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 
1507 (2001) (“[T]he total [estimated] number of patents litigated or licensed for a royalty (as op-
posed to a cross-license) is on the order of five percent of issued patents.”). 
 102. For discussion of the factors that account for this phenomenon, see Gideon  
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2005), which lays out a 
general economic account of strategic patenting, and Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of So-
licitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2187, 2222 (2000), which 
discusses patenting aimed solely at blocking competition. 
 103. W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Product Liability, Research and Development, and 
Innovation, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 161 (1993). 
 104. Id. at 164–66, 174, 182. The study associates those payouts with the premiums firms 
paid insurers to obtain product liability coverage. It measures the intensity of the firms’ efforts to 
innovate by associating it with the firms’ expenditures on R&D. Id. at 169–72. 
 105. See id. at 164. 
 106. Id. at 164–66, 174. 
 107. Id. For discussions of this study, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Product Safety Regulation 
and the Law of Torts, in Product Liability and Innovation: Managing Risk in an Uncertain 
Environment 151, 151 (1994); Barton, supra note 100, at 278–80. 
PARCHOMOVSKY & STEIN FINAL PRINT1 B.DOC 10/20/2008 10:52 AM 
308 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 107:285 
 
Viscusi and Moore’s study is most impressive in its scope, model, and 
methodology.108 We believe, nonetheless, that the reported findings do not 
capture the full effect of tort liability—or even product liability alone—on 
innovation. By focusing exclusively on firms’ liability payouts, the study 
does not account for custom rules’ distortionary effect on innovation. A 
firm’s expectation of high-liability payouts will not necessarily induce it 
simply to cut back on R&D. Instead, the firm may confine its R&D activi-
ties to conventional technological frameworks. Staying within the 
conventional framework will allow a firm not only to avoid the doctrinal tax 
imposed on non-conventional innovators but also to do better by accepting 
the law’s subsidy for improvements of customary technologies. Alterna-
tively, the firm may patent its novel technologies without transforming them 
into products, just in order to block competitors. For these reasons, a firm’s 
investment in R&D is not a dependable criterion for measuring the effects of 
tort liability on innovation. The custom rules do not always chill a firm’s 
innovative activities completely. They will, in some cases, divert the path of 
those activities, prompting firms to develop products with low liability pros-
pects despite the feasibility of technologically superior and safer 
alternatives. Indeed, a firm may even increase its investment in R&D in or-
der to develop “liability-proof” products that align with industrial customs. 
Under this scenario, the firm’s R&D investment would not be indicative of 
any scientific or technological advancement whatsoever. 
Finally, it should be noted that, since innovation in many technological 
areas is cumulative, with new inventions building on preexisting ones, the 
dynamic efficiency loss occasioned by the custom rules may be far greater 
than it seems. By preventing certain inventions from ever being produced, 
the custom rules deprive society not only of those particular inventions but 
also of many subsequent innovations. 
III. Remedying the Anti-Innovation Bias 
The discussion so far established the prevalence of custom rules in our 
torts system and demonstrated their adverse effect on innovation. In this 
Part, we explore ways to correct this distortion. Policymakers can reform 
tort law in one of two ways to make it more welcoming to innovation. The 
first way to level the playfield is to eliminate the privileged status of custom 
and switch to a pure cost-benefit system. We term this alternative 
“equalizing down.” An alternative way would be to retain the current 
deference to industry custom but grant certain innovations, whose safety 
was confirmed by a special board of experts in each industry, the same 
privileged status as enjoyed by custom. We term this alternative “equalizing 
up.” In the remainder of this Part, we discuss the two alternatives and assess 
their respective strengths and weaknesses.  
                                                                                                                      
 108. Additional studies can be found in The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability 
Law on Safety and Innovation (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991), a collection of 
essays that examine empirically, but ultimately leave open, the question whether product liability 
chills innovation. 
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A. Equalizing Down: Doing Away with Custom Rules 
Firms’ rewards ought to be based on the costs and benefits their activi-
ties produce rather than on the extent of their compliance with customs. 
Firms that produce the greatest benefits and least damage should prevail in 
the marketplace. To enable fair competition among firms, the legal system 
should not impose special burdens on innovators in the form of an increased 
prospect of liability in torts; nor should it subsidize replicators of conven-
tional technologies by decreasing their prospect of liability. The most 
straightforward way of accomplishing this would be to shift to a pure cost-
benefit system that gives no deference to custom. To this end, the legal sys-
tem should eliminate the evidential association between innovations and an 
increased risk of harm as well as abolish the rules that link safety to compli-
ance with custom. We now turn to explaining how this proposal can be 
implemented in each of the areas we discussed: medical malpractice, prod-
uct liability, and negligence. 
In the area of medical malpractice, we propose that liability should be 
left to contractual agreements between physicians and patients—as is the 
case today. We wholeheartedly believe that the legal system is right to rec-
tify the informational disparity between patients and doctors by setting forth 
elaborate requirements for “informed consent.” But it went awry in develop-
ing two different standards of “informed consent,” instead of one uniform 
standard. In other words, the “informed consent” standards for conventional 
and innovative treatments should be the same across the board. If a patient 
needs to know her doctor’s rate of success in performing a particular proce-
dure, this information should be given to the patient not only when the 
procedure is innovative and “experimental,” but also when it is conven-
tional.109 Likewise, if a doctor must disclose her personal interest in 
delivering the chosen treatment, the doctor’s duty should not depend on 
whether the treatment is conventional or “experimental.”110 Similarly, if a 
potential recipient of an innovative treatment needs to be aware of the treat-
ment’s conventional alternatives,111 patients receiving conventional medicine 
should then be informed about alternative options.112 Finally, all doctors 
must give the patient correct information about the treatment’s risks and 
benefits. They should not be required to indiscriminately attach the “un-
known” label to all risks and benefits associated with innovative 
                                                                                                                      
 109. Cf. Johnson ex rel. Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996) (holding that a 
doctor’s failure to disclose his success rates to patient violated “informed consent”); Aaron D. Twer-
ski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each 
Other, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1999) (advocating general disclosure of doctors’ success rates). 
 110. See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 463, 487–97 (2002) (de-
scribing trust as a foundation of doctor-patient relationship); Paul B. Miller & Charles Weijer, 
Fiduciary Obligation in Clinical Research, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 424 (2006) (outlining doctors’ 
general obligation to inform patients about conflicts of interest).  
 111. See Noah, supra note 91, at 366 (“[P]hysicians generally must disclose reasonable alter-
native courses of action to the patient.”). 
 112. Cf. Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129, 1133 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that doctors need not 
inform patients about experimental treatments). 
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treatments.113 This reform would place innovative treatments on an informa-
tional par with conventional ones. By doing so, it would enable physicians 
to administer innovative treatments without exposing themselves to an in-
creased risk of liability.  
In the areas of product liability and general liability for accidents, where 
contracting between potential injurers and victims is not practicable on ac-
count of high transaction costs, we propose to eliminate the anti-innovation 
bias by abolishing the rules that establish this bias. Courts should deem in-
dustry customs irrelevant. Accordingly, industry customs should neither be 
admitted as evidence in negligence cases, when courts determine whether 
the precautions undertaken by the plaintiff were adequate, nor in product 
liability suits, when courts decide the “risk-utility” of product designs and 
set “consumer expectation” criteria. Every tort suit would then involve a 
custom-free examination of the risk of harm of the defendant’s activities. 
The defendant would be held negligent and responsible for the damage 
caused when the risk to which he exposed the plaintiff required greater pre-
cautions than he actually took. In the product liability area, courts would 
hold a product’s design defective when the risk of harm for an average con-
sumer exceeded the product’s benefits. The defendant’s compliance or 
failure to comply with custom would not go into evidence, and the fact 
finder would consequently ignore it.  
The res ipsa rule should undergo a similar adjustment. The rule’s “ordi-
nary course of events” criterion associates negligence with any case in 
which the defendant causes damage to the plaintiff, without taking conven-
tional precautions against that damage. Defendants who take conventional 
or customary precautions sidestep this evidential association. Defendants 
who use novel technology to avoid damage remain subject to the res ipsa 
rule and are consequently treated similarly to defendants who took no pre-
cautions at all. We propose to eliminate this distortion with a new rule that 
would attach a presumption of negligence only to cases featuring no precau-
tions against damage whatsoever. In cases where some precautions were 
taken, the defendant’s negligence ought to be proven, not presumed. In par-
ticular, no presumption of negligence should attach to innovative 
precautions that depart from custom. If a plaintiff claims that the novel 
technology is unsafe, she ought to produce evidence that substantiates this 
claim. And if she fails to produce such evidence, the judge should dismiss 
the lawsuit. The res ipsa rule should not allow such a plaintiff to move her 
suit to the jury—a prospect that presently exposes innovators to a risk of 
losing the case114 and puts them under serious pressure to settle. 
Finally, rules controlling the admission of expert testimony—both Frye 
and Daubert—should remove all their restrictions on novel science and 
technology. To allow innovators to rebut accusations of wrongdoing, the law 
should permit innovators’ experts to testify in their defense. No other expert 
                                                                                                                      
 113. See Noah, supra note 91, at 377–79 (questioning the wisdom of the heightened informed-
consent requirements for experimental treatments). 
 114. See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text. 
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can properly develop the innovator’s claim that her novel technology is safe. 
Admissibility of the innovator’s expert testimony, therefore, should not de-
pend on whether it aligns with accepted wisdom. 
Our reform proposal gives rise to two objections. The first objection is 
that our analysis underestimates the importance of experience, dubbed the 
“life of the law” by one great jurist.115 The gist of this objection is that con-
ventional knowledge and technologies have been tested by and received 
affirmation from experience, while new technologies and knowledge have 
not yet passed this test. For this reason, society would do well to deem the 
time-honored conventional knowledge and technologies less hazardous than 
the new ones. The legal system consequently should design rules that induce 
firms and individuals whose activities might cause harm to another person 
to use conventional knowledge and technologies and exercise caution with 
innovations. This is what the custom rules do.  
The second objection focuses on the adjudicative efficiency of the cus-
tom rules. Specifically, it holds that those rules minimize the costs of 
adjudicative errors and error avoidance as a total sum.116 The cost of adjudi-
cative errors is defined by the value of liabilities and entitlements that 
adjudicators mistakenly fail to recognize (and the legal system consequently 
fails to enforce). The cost of error avoidance, on the other hand, aggregates 
the expenditures on procedures and decisions that enhance accuracy in ad-
judication. Custom rules minimize the sum of those costs in three distinct 
ways. They protect damage-producing but still faultless firms against adju-
dicators’ biases and populist temptations.117 They also set dependable 
shortcuts for determinations of negligence by adjudicators who might decide 
cases erroneously if left to their own devices.118 Finally, the rules increase 
the probability of an out-of-court settlement by making adjudicative proce-
dures and decisions more predictable.119  
We consider these two objections in order. We believe that the experi-
ence-based objection is overstated. Conventional knowledge and 
technologies have indeed been validated by human experience, a factor that 
weighs in their favor. Human experience, however, provides no reasons for 
being indiscriminately suspicious of novel technologies and medical treat-
ments. Some novel technologies and treatments are unsafe, but many others 
are both safer and more efficacious than conventional alternatives. Any nov-
elty, therefore, needs to be accepted or rejected on the merits. If a piece of 
experience-based knowledge is sound, it should be able to defeat its rivals 
                                                                                                                      
 115. O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1881). 
 116. This is what many rules of evidence actually do. See Alex Stein, Foundations of 
Evidence Law 141–71 (2005). 
 117. See Morris, supra note 16, at 1147–49. 
 118. See Henderson, supra note 16, at 923–24. 
 119. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and settlement under imperfect informa-
tion, 15 Rand J. Econ. 404 (1984) (observing that parties’ symmetrical information about trial’s 
outcome promotes settlement and analyzing the nature and probability of settlements under asym-
metrical information). 
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by its own epistemic force; and if it is questionable, it should not be pro-
tected against innovators’ challenges. Sound knowledge needs no special 
reinforcement from the law. Unsound knowledge does not deserve that rein-
forcement. 
The incumbent incentive is another reason for removing the a priori sus-
picion from novel technologies and medical treatments. Lines separating the 
novel from the conventional are not always drawn by impartial scientists. 
They are frequently drawn by owners and producers of conventional tech-
nologies, who are motivated to obstruct innovations in order to maintain 
their superiority on the market. The state should not protect these incum-
bents’ interests by setting up rules that disfavor innovators. Furthermore, the 
state should normally stay away from the marketplace for knowledge and 
technologies.120 
The efficiency-based objection to our proposals is equally unconvincing. 
The saving in adjudicative costs stemming from custom rules has a limit. 
Consequently, the social loss resulting from the innovations depressed by 
the custom rules is likely to be much greater. The benefits that a single life-
saving technology or medical treatment can produce over time may well be 
greater than the total saving of adjudicative costs generated by the custom 
rules. It is, therefore, hard to see how the custom rules’ advantages can off-
set the value of depressed innovations. 
Ultimately, of course, the question whether the benefits from abolishing 
the custom rules would outweigh the costs thereof is an empirical one. We 
are not aware of any empirical studies that analyze this question. It is possi-
ble, therefore, that some readers may be wary of our call to abolish custom 
rules and would prefer to retain them. To put the minds of such readers at 
ease, we next delineate an alternative reform proposal that would make tort 
law more innovation friendly without abandoning the custom baseline. 
B. Equalizing Up: Elevating Innovations to the Status of Custom 
If policymakers deem the advantages stemming from the use of custom 
rules worth keeping, they can make tort law more innovation friendly by 
granting certain (not all) new technologies the same privileged status as cus-
tom. To do so, special private boards of industry experts will be set up to 
review the safety of scientific and technological innovations in their relevant 
areas of expertise. Courts, in turn, will recognize those boards’ findings by 
treating them as equivalent to customs. Innovators will then be able to sub-
mit their innovations for review by the relevant board. Innovations that 
successfully pass the inspection process will be entitled to the same status as 
customary and conventional technologies and will receive the same defer-
ence from courts in tort suits. Innovations that fail to receive the relevant 
                                                                                                                      
 120. This point echoes Hayek’s economic theory of information production. See Richard A. 
Posner, Hayek, Law, and Cognition, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty 147 (2005) (expounding Hayek’s 
theory of private and decentralized information production); see also id. at 149–50 (attesting that, 
under Hayek’s theory, legal sanctions should be used to enforce only abstract customs that set gen-
eral frameworks for people’s interactions). 
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board’s approval will be deemed unsafe in any subsequent tort litigation. If a 
board fails to reach a decision during a period of two years, the innovation, 
once again, will be deemed as safe as any technology or medical treatment 
approved by custom.121 
The proposed mechanism will alleviate much of the anti-innovation bias 
that plagues the existing system of torts, but only by generating several new 
costs.122 First, the review process will delay the introduction of new tech-
nologies to markets. The review process is likely to take months, and until it 
is completed consumers will not be able to enjoy the innovations. Even so, 
the proposal probably represents a significant improvement over the current 
regime, which likely causes much greater delays in the introduction of inno-
vations and sometimes blocks them altogether. Also, since the review is not 
mandatory, innovators who are certain of the safety of their products and 
services may choose not to subject them to board review and take their 
chances with courts.  
                                                                                                                      
 121. A comparison with Federal Drug Administration (“FDA”) review is instructive. Under 
the accelerated, fee-based review system, it takes about a year on average for the FDA to give a pre-
market approval to a drug, both new and generic, while the average period for a pre-market approval 
of medical devices is five months. Michele Schoonmaker, CRS Report for Congress, The U.S. 
Approval Process for Medical Devices: Legislative Issues and Comparison with the Drug 
Model 33 tbl. 2 (2005). In a not so distant past, the average period for a new drug’s non-expedited 
approval by FDA was eight and a half years. Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Res., Dep’t of 
Health and Human Serv., The CDER Handbook 5 (rev., 1998). For medical devices, the ap-
proval period ranged between “months or even several years.” Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Meeting 
the Objectives of the MDA: Implied Preemption of State Tort Claims by the Medical Device Amend-
ments, 10 J.L. & Health 343, 347 (1995–96). Our two-year limit proposal accounts for the modern 
tendency to shorten the approval period, but is also mindful of four additional factors. First, the 
proposed review system is private and optional rather than state-imposed and compulsory. Second, 
proper scientific review of a novel technology may require lengthy experiments. Third, the FDA 
system, unlike ours, has no approval-by-default provision in the event of unduly delayed review. 
Finally, our equalizing-up mechanism effectively shields the innovator from liability in torts, while 
an FDA approval of a drug or medical device does not always have such effect. See Medtronic, Inc. 
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (holding in connection with medical devices that FDA approval pursu-
ant to section 510 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended by the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976, does not block tort actions in state courts for both negligence and product 
liability); David G. Owen, Products Liability Law § 8.10 at 558 & n.56 (2005) (attesting that 
drug manufacturers are liable for defective drugs despite FDA’s clearance and presenting relevant 
case-law). But see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (holding that when a medical 
device satisfies the FDA requirements for its pre-market approval, the manufacturer will defeat the 
tort action). Following this decision, the FDA may equalize-up the status of innovative medical 
devices. Whether it will do so often enough is an open question. 
 122. Eradication of the anti-innovation bias also can be achieved by substituting the fault-
based doctrines of negligence and product liability with a no-fault regime of strict liability. This 
reform would do away with the custom rules, but in a radical and intensely controversial way that 
we avoid recommending. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA 
L. Rev. 377 (2002) (analyzing problems that a transition from negligence to strict liability would 
engender). The federal preemption mechanism is another far-reaching alternative. This mechanism 
blocks tort actions complaining against technologies that comply with the safety standards set by the 
appropriate federal agency. The agency consequently can “equalize up” new technologies that are 
yet to become state-of-the-art. See, e.g., Riegel, 128 S.Ct. 999 (holding that requirements for pre-
market approval of medical devices, issued by FDA pursuant to section 510 of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, as amended by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, preempt conflicting tort 
actions against manufacturers); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864–86 (2000) (hold-
ing that the DOT’s Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, promulgated under the National Traffic 
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, preempt conflicting tort actions against car manufacturers). 
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Second, implementation of the proposal will create new costs. The pro-
posed review boards must be funded, and it will be the innovators who 
submit applications for review who will have to pick up the bill. The addi-
tional cost borne by innovators will increase the cost of commercializing 
innovations. On the margin, this cost increase may thwart commercializa-
tion of certain innovations and the production of others. To determine the 
social desirability of our proposal, it would be necessary to compare its 
chilling effect on innovation to the chilling effect of custom rules. Once 
again, we are not aware of empirical data that can aid policymakers in mak-
ing this determination. Yet, for the reasons provided in Part II, we believe 
that the adverse effect of the current regime is greater. Furthermore, it must 
be borne in mind that our proposal does not force innovators to submit their 
innovations to board review; it only gives them an option to do so. Whether 
to use this option or live with the current custom-driven regime is the inno-
vator’s call. Hence, it is difficult to see how our proposal will make 
innovators worse off relative to the existing system.  
Our proposal gives rise to still other costs: rent-seeking and favoritism. 
Board members can seek side payments from innovators as a condition for 
approving their technologies. Likewise, reviewers can play favorites with 
innovators and base their decisions on personal, rather than professional, 
reasons. The specter of these twin problems arises with respect to any ad-
ministrative process, and our proposal is obviously no exception. Yet if 
board members are selected from firms within every industry, the problem 
may be more acute. Board members who review applications must be as 
independent as possible, preferably without prior affiliation to any of the 
firms whose innovations come under review.  
At the end of the day, in deciding whether to retain the custom rules, 
policymakers ought to assess the net benefit from adopting our proposal and 
compare it to that of the custom rules. This assessment, of course, should 
include the value of innovations that the custom rules presently depress. One 
practical way to assess this tradeoff would be to implement our proposal in a 
single industry and measure the net effect. If the small scale experiment 
proves successful, it should be extended to other industries. 
Conclusion 
Innovation, like all other human behavior, is affected by legal rules. In 
this Essay, we analyzed the effect of tort liability on innovation. Tort law is 
commonly thought of as a mechanism of assigning liability to wrongdoers 
and thereby forcing them to internalize the costs they impose on others. 
This, indeed, is its primary effect. Yet, as we demonstrated in this Essay, tort 
law has a second, less salutary effect. By establishing safe harbors for indus-
try customs and conventional technology, tort law taxes innovation and 
influences its course. Did policymakers intend to create this effect? For all 
we know, this hidden effect may well be inadvertent. It is quite possible that 
policymakers failed to appreciate the connection between tort liability and 
innovation. We were not able to find any historical records that address this 
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issue. What is more important, however, is that there is no a priori reason 
why tort law must impede innovation. There is no necessary connection be-
tween the deterrent effect and the anti-innovation effect of tort law; the two 
can be easily decoupled. It is possible to benefit from the deterrent effect of 
tort liability on wrongdoers without paying a significant price in the form of 
forgone or distorted innovation. As we explained, policymakers can accom-
plish this result either by eliminating courts’ reliance on custom in making 
liability determinations or by instructing courts to give innovations whose 
safety was verified by independent industry experts the same deference they 
give custom. We openly admit that our solutions are not cost-free, but the 
costs to which they give rise are likely to be far outweighed by the benefits 
of unhindered innovation. 
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